

# The Completeness Theorem

$$\Sigma \models \sigma \text{ iff } \Sigma \vdash \sigma$$



# Nature decides truth

The relation  $\models$  defines a Galois connection between  $L$ -structures and  $L$ -sentences.

We write  $\Sigma \models \sigma$  to indicate that  $\sigma$  lies in the Galois closure of  $\Sigma$ .  
(i.e.  $\sigma \in \Sigma^{\perp\perp}$ ).

How can we characterize the Galois closure of  $\Sigma$  “internally”? (meaning: how can you determine whether  $\sigma \in \Sigma^{\perp\perp}$  without referring to structures?)

# Humans decide provability

We create a machine called “proof”, where  $\sigma$  is provable from  $\Sigma$  ( $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$ ) iff  $\sigma$  is a semantic consequence of  $\Sigma$  ( $\Sigma \models \sigma$ ).

If our only goal is to characterize Galois closure internally, then we only demand that our proof calculus be

- Sound ( $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  implies  $\Sigma \models \sigma$ ), and
- Complete ( $\Sigma \models \sigma$  implies  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$ ).

But, since we are humans, we shall also demand that

- proofs should be recognizable as proofs.

**Df.**  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  means there is a finite sequence of formulas

$$\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n = \sigma$$

where each  $\alpha_i$  is an **axiom**, a member of  $\Sigma$ , or is derivable from earlier terms in the sequence using a **rule of inference**.

# What is needed?

We should choose **axioms** so that they are recognizable instances of  $\models \alpha$ .

We should choose rules of inference, typically written  $\frac{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m}{\beta}$ , so that they are recognizable instances of  $\{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m\} \models \beta$ .

“Should” means: if we do this, then soundness will hold.

## Axioms.

- 1 All tautologies.
- 2  $=$  is an equivalence relation on terms.
- 3 Can substitute equals for equals without changing meaning.
- 4  $(\forall x_i(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)) \rightarrow (\forall x_i \alpha \rightarrow \forall x_i \beta)$
- 5  $(\alpha \rightarrow \forall x_i \alpha)$  if  $x_i$  does not appear in formula  $\alpha$ .
- 6  $(\exists x_i(x_i = t))$  if  $x_i$  does not occur in term  $t$ .

## Rules.

- 1 (Modus Ponens)  $\frac{\alpha, \alpha \rightarrow \beta}{\beta}$
- 2 (Generalization)  $\frac{\varphi}{(\forall x_i) \varphi}$

# Stage 1: the Deduction Theorem

Observe that  $\Sigma \models \sigma$  iff  $\Sigma \cup \{\neg\sigma\} \models \perp$ . (Note:  $\forall A (A \not\models \perp)$ . I.e.,  $\perp$  is not satisfiable.)

Therefore we want  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  iff  $\Sigma \cup \{\neg\sigma\} \vdash \perp$ .

“More generally”,  $\Sigma \cup \{\alpha\} \models \beta$  iff  $\Sigma \models (\alpha \rightarrow \beta)$ .

So we want  $\Sigma \cup \{\alpha\} \vdash \beta$  iff  $\Sigma \vdash (\alpha \rightarrow \beta)$ .

Reverse direction is direct and easy.

Forward direction is proved by induction on the length of a proof of  $\Sigma \cup \{\alpha\} \vdash \beta$ .

It is also easy.

[Idea: Replace every  $\alpha_i$  in a  $(\Sigma \cup \{\alpha\})$ -proof of  $\beta$  with  $\alpha \rightarrow \alpha_i$  to obtain a  $\Sigma$ -proof of  $(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)$ .]

The second part is called:

**Deduction Thm.** If  $\Sigma \cup \{\alpha\} \models \beta$ , then  $\Sigma \models (\alpha \rightarrow \beta)$ .

# Application

Our goal is to prove that  $\Sigma \models \sigma$  implies  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$ .

Equivalently, if  $\Gamma := \Sigma \cup \{\neg\sigma\}$  is not **satisfiable** ( $\Gamma \models \perp$ ), then it is not **consistent** ( $\Gamma \vdash \perp$ ).

Contrapositively, if  $\Gamma$  is consistent, then it is satisfiable (i.e. has a model).  
(This reformulation is worth remembering! )

Strategy to achieve our goal:

- 1 Show that a consistent theory  $\Gamma$  can be enlarged to a “Henkin theory”.
- 2 Show that a Henkin theory has a model.
- 3 Show that a model of an enlargement of  $\Gamma$  is also a model of  $\Gamma$ . (Duh!)

# Henkin theory

**Df.** A theory  $\Gamma$  is a Henkin theory if it is

- ① **consistent**,
- ② **complete**, and
- ③ **has witnesses**.

Meanings:

- ① A theory is **consistent** if you can't prove falsity from it.
- ② A consistent theory  $\Gamma$  is **complete** if it decides every sentence:  
For every  $\sigma$ , either  $\sigma \in \Gamma$  or  $(\neg\sigma) \in \Gamma$ .
- ③ A theory  $\Gamma$  **has witnesses** if whenever  $\varphi(x)$  is a formula with one free variable, then  $((\exists x)\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(c)) \in \Gamma$  for some constant  $c$ .

Henkin's key insight is that if  $\mathbb{A}$  is a structure, then the theory of its “expansion by constants”,  $\Gamma = \text{Th}(\mathbb{A}_A)$ , is a Henkin theory. Conversely every Henkin theory arises in this way. Moreover,  $\text{Th}(\mathbb{A}_A)$  explains clearly how to construct its canonical model,  $\mathbb{A}_A$ .

# The enlargement steps

**Lindenbaum's Theorem.** Every consistent  $L$ -theory can be enlarged to a complete  $L$ -theory.

[Idea: if  $\Gamma \not\vdash \sigma$ , then  $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\sigma\} \not\vdash \perp$ , so  $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\sigma\}$  is a consistent enlargement of  $\Gamma$ . Keep doing this until you arrive at a complete theory.]

**Henkin's Theorem.** Every consistent theory can be enlarged to a consistent theory with witnesses, provided we allow ourselves to enlarge the language to include more constant symbols.

[Idea: suppose  $\Gamma \cup \{(\exists x)\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(c)\} \vdash \perp$  where  $c \notin L$ . Then  $\Gamma \vdash \neg((\exists x)\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(c))$ , or  $\Gamma \vdash (\exists x)\varphi(x) \wedge \neg\varphi(c)$ . Need quantifier axioms and rules which permit this deduction:

$$(\exists x)\varphi(x) \wedge \neg\varphi(c), (\forall x)((\exists x)\varphi(x) \wedge \neg\varphi(x)), (\exists x)\varphi(x) \wedge \neg(\exists x)\varphi(x), \perp.$$

Thus  $\Gamma \vdash \perp$ . Now repeat the idea of Lindenbaum's Theorem with  $\sigma$  equal to  $\neg((\exists x)\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(c))$ .]



## Finally: Henkin theories have an obvious model.

Let  $H$  be a Henkin  $L$ -theory. (= consistent, complete, with witnesses.)

Let  $C$  be the set of constants in  $L$ . It will be the domain of an  $L$ -structure.

If  $c \in L$ , then define  $c^{\mathbb{C}} = c \in C$ .

If  $R(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is a predicate symbol, declare that  $R^{\mathbb{C}}(c_1, \dots, c_n)$  is true if  $R(c_1, \dots, c_n) \in H$ .

If  $F(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is a function symbol, declare that  $F^{\mathbb{C}}(c_1, \dots, c_n) = d$  is true if  $(F(c_1, \dots, c_n) = d) \in H$ .

Define an equivalence relation  $\theta$  on  $C$  by  $c \equiv d \pmod{\theta}$  if  $(c = d) \in H$ .

It will be the case that  $\mathbb{C}/\theta \models H$ . In fact,  $H = \text{Th}(\mathbb{C}/\theta)$ .  $\mathbb{C}/\theta$  is called the Henkin model of  $H$ .